Platforms use search diversion in order to trade o¤ total consumer tra¢ c for higher revenues derived by exposing consumers to unsolicited products (e.g. advertising). We show that competition between platforms leads to lower equilibrium levels of search diversion relative to a monopoly platform when the intensity of competition is high. On the other hand, if there is only mild competition, then competing platforms induce more search diversion relative to a platform monopolist.
Introduction
Search diversion occurs when platforms providing access to various products deliberately introduce noise in the search or browsing process through which consumers …nd the products they are most interested in. This practice is widespread among both o-ine and online platforms. All advertising-supported media (from magazines to online portals, news sites, and search engines) are purposefully designed to expose users to advertisements, even though they are primarily interested in content. Similarly, retailers often place the most sought-after items at the back or upper ‡oors of their stores (e.g. bread and milk at supermarkets, iPods and iPhones at Apple stores), while shopping malls design their layout to maximize the distance travelled by visitors between anchor stores (Petroski 2003 ). E-commerce sites (e.g. Amazon, Bing Shopping, eBay, Google Shopping) design their websites in order to divert users'attention away from the products they were initially looking for, and towards the discovery of products that they might be interested in and eventually buy (unsolicited products or advertising).
On the one hand, search diversion may lead to higher platform revenues per consumer "visit" to the platform. On the other hand, it reduces the overall attractiveness of the platform to consumers and therefore also leads to lower consumer tra¢ c (i.e. total number of visits). All platforms listed above face this fundamental trade-o¤.
The basic economic logic of search diversion was …rst analyzed by Hagiu and Jullien (2011) , using a model with a monopoly platform (intermediary) that o¤ers consumers access to two products, whose a¢ liation with (i.e. availability through) the platform is exogenously given.
Here we extend that analysis by adding two important elements: (i) platform competition and (ii) endogenous a¢ liation on both sides of the market -consumers and an unsolicited product supplier (advertiser).
Our main result is that when consumers a¢ liate exclusively with one platform, competition does not necessarily reduce search diversion incentives relative to monopoly. Speci…cally, if competition between platforms is intense (low degree of di¤erentiation) then competing platforms induce less search diversion than a monopolist. But when competition is of moderate intensity (intermediate degree of di¤erentiation), search diversion is greater than in the case of a monopoly platform. Finally, if the degree of platform di¤erentiation is large then competing platforms behave like local monopolies and therefore choose the monopoly level of search diversion. One interpretation of the scenario in which competing platforms divert search more than a monopoly is that, since consumers are more di¢ cult to attract under competition, platforms may prefer to increase revenue per consumer by diverting more search. This result holds whether the advertiser a¢ liates exclusively or multihomes. Moreover, with exclusive advertising a¢ liation, each platform takes into account its competitor's incentives to compete for the advertiser.
As a result, when competition is e¤ective on both sides, the equilibrium level of search diversion maximizes total industry pro…t (both platforms and the advertiser). On the other hand, one platform may prefer not to compete for the advertiser if it derives su¢ cient consumer demand and revenue from the content solicited by consumers. In this case, the equilibrium level of search diversion does not account for the "losing" platform's pro…ts.
Second, allowing platforms to charge …xed access fees results in less search diversion if and only if the actual fee charged is positive. Furthermore, if platforms can charge consumers access fees, competing platforms choose the same level of search diversion as a monopoly platform for all parameter values and regardless of the mode of platform competition: all platforms maximize the total surplus per consumer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next two subsections we provide a brief overview of our model and of the relevant literature. Section 2 lays out the modeling set-up and analyzes the monopoly platform case, with endogenous consumer and advertising a¢ liation. Section 3 introduces competition between platforms and analyzes three scenarios: a) platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of consumers, whereas the advertiser multihomes; b) platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of the advertiser, whereas consumers multihome; c) platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of both consumers and the advertiser.
In section 4 we introduce the possibility for platforms to charge consumers access fees. Section 5 concludes.
Model overview and interpretation
In our model, each platform o¤ers consumers access to two products, 1 and 2. Product 1 (content) o¤ers consumers expected utility u 1 > 0 and is assumed to be exogenously a¢ liated with each platform throughout the paper. Product 2 corresponds to unsolicited content, which for convenience we refer to as advertising. It o¤ers consumers expected utility u 2 = 0 and is supplied by a third-party seller (advertiser), who must be induced to a¢ liate by platforms' choices of fees and search diversion. Platforms may derive positive revenues from consumer exposure to both products. Each product exposure is costly to consumers: it requires time and attention. The platforms'revenues per consumer exposure to product 1 ( 1 ) could be referral fees paid by an independent seller or the margin made on the sale of product 1 multiplied by the conversion rate (probability that a consumer who sees the product ends up buying it) if the platform supplies product 1 itself; or any type of fees directly tied to usage of product 1 (e.g. pay-per-view). Meanwhile, the platforms'revenues per consumer exposure to product 2 ( 2 ) can be interpreted as "per-impression" or "per-click" fees paid by its seller.
The key decision made by the platform is the amount of search diversion to induce through its service, which we identify with the probability that it exposes consumers to product 2 before directing them to product 1. Indeed, although consumers always prefer being immediately exposed to product 1, the platform may …nd that …rst diverting them to product 2 maximizes total revenues. We use the term "search" because in a sense consumers are searching for product 1 and the platform chooses how e¢ cient to make this search process. More search diversion leads to higher total exposure costs incurred by consumers. Table 1 Our modelling set-up is best interpreted as a stylized representation of advertising-supported media, such as the ones listed in Table 1 . 1 All platforms listed in Table 1 provide users with …rst-party content (cf. Hagiu and Spulber 2012), such as organic search results, information, editorial stories or products sold in their own name. All of them make positive revenues from user exposure to advertising or products users were not necessarily looking for ( 2 > 0). Some of them (search engines, content portals) make no revenues from …rst-party content, while others (shopping portals, e-commerce and paid video sites) derive positive revenues from exposing consumers to …rst-party content. For shopping portals, 1 is equal to the click-through rate of listed products multiplied by the referral fees charged to the third-party merchants who sell those products. For online video sites and e-commerce, 1 is the conversion rate multiplied by the video-on-demand prices (Hulu, Vimeo) or the booking fees charged to users (Fandango) or the margins made on shoes sold (Zappos).
The extent of search diversion varies across these platforms from minimal (small and unin-1 CPM is the advertising industry term for cost per impression (literally, "cost per mille", i.e. a thousand impressions), while CPC stands for "cost per click". trusive ads on Fandango.com, sponsored search results at the bottom of Google Shopping pages) to moderate (sponsored search results at the top and right-hand side of Google's search engine pages) to very high (in addition to showing several large ads on every content page, Forbes.com requires users to view a video ad prior to watching every piece of video content and oftentimes to click through a full-page display ad before reaching the desired content page).
Related literature
Our paper builds upon the model of search diversion introduced by Hagiu and Jullien (2011).
That paper established that search diversion allows platforms to: (i) trade o¤ higher total consumer tra¢ c for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) in ‡uence independent product sellers' choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). It also showed that search diversion is a strategic instrument that cannot be easily replaced by contractual extensions and that it can be socially desirable because consumers do not internalize the bene…ts of their search activities for product sellers. We extend Hagiu and Jullien (2011)'s analysis in two important and novel directions: competition among platforms and endogenous product and consumer a¢ liation (Hagiu and Jullien 2011 focus exclusively on a monopoly platform with exogenously given product and consumer a¢ liation).
We contribute to the economics and strategy literature on two-sided platforms by introducing a key design decision that many platforms have to make, but has not been formally studied: At a broader level, several articles have pointed out that platforms have to make design compromises between the interests of their two sides (e.g. Kaplan (2009) consider a newspaper model where the quality of news reporting matters for readers but also for (non-intrusive) advertising e¤ectiveness. They …nd that newspaper competition has an ambiguous e¤ect on news quality. These papers study product positioning and product quality choices by ad-sponsored platforms. In contrast, our focus is on the design of platforms'product exposure mechanism.
A very recent strand of this literature studies the e¤ect of consumers' and advertisers' "multihoming" behavior (i.e. their presence on multiple online outlets) on …rm pro…ts. Athey Calvano and Gans (2012) show that the value of advertising in one outlet depends on consumer multihoming and focus on tracking technologies, while Athey and Gans (2010) study targeted advertising. In our competition sections, we analyze the impact of consumer and advertiser multihoming on the endogenous rate of exposure to advertising (search diversion in our model).
Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2012) discuss the nature of price competition when all agents can multihome. We share with them the conclusion that competition does not restore e¢ ciency, but their paper focuses on the volume of advertising, whereas we focus on the design of the exposure service. Broadly, targeting, tracking and diversion can all be viewed as various instances of platform service design, thus our work is complementary to this stream of literature.
Monopoly platform set-up
In this section we lay out the foundation for our analysis using a variant of the model in Hagiu and Jullien (2011) . We present the model here but postpone its discussion until after proposition 1, where it will be more transparent. There is a monopoly platform which allows a unit mass of consumers to access two products, 1 and 2. Product 1 is already available through (or a¢ liated with) the platform, while product 2 must be attracted by the platform (its a¢ liation is endogenous). To access either product, a consumer must …rst a¢ liate with (i.e. visit) the platform and then be exposed to the product through a search process described below. Consumers are interested in product 1 only, which can be interpreted as content, e.g. editorial stories, videos, organic search results. They are not interested in product 2, which can be interpreted as advertising.
Consumers
All consumers derive net expected utility u 1 = u from being exposed to product 1 and u 2 = 0 from being exposed to product 2, where 0 < u < 1 is exogenously given. These utilities should be interpreted as encompassing the utility of just viewing the product plus the expected utility of actually consuming it, net of the price paid (we do not model product pricing decisions).
Ex-ante, i.e. before a¢ liating with the platform, consumers only di¤er in their location x, uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The monopoly platform is located at 0. When consumer x a¢ liates with the platform, she incurs transportation costs tx, where t > 0.
Ex-post, i.e. after deciding whether or not to a¢ liate with the platform, consumers learn their unitary cost of exposure (or cost of search) c, which they incur whenever they are exposed to a product. When both products are a¢ liated with the platform, consumers can only view them sequentially and therefore are subject to one or two product exposures. The search cost c can be interpreted as the cost of consumer attention; it is distributed on [0; 1] according to a twice continuously di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function F . From an ex-ante perspective, a consumer located at any position x perceives the same ex-post distribution of search costs F (:).
Thus, consumers make two decisions: whether or not to visit the platform, and whether or not to engage in product search if they decided to visit the platform.
The platform
For conciseness, we assume that the monopoly platform is vertically integrated into product 1.
The platform derives expected pro…ts 1 0 for each consumer exposure to product 1, where 1 is known by all players and exogenously …xed. Product 2 is supplied by an independent seller (advertiser), who must be induced to a¢ liate.
The advertiser derives pro…t 2 for every consumer exposure to its product, which is also publicly known (we study the case in which 2 is unobservable in section ??). In order to a¢ liate with the platform and gain access to its consumers, the advertiser must pay the platform a perimpression (per-click) fee r. We assume the platform has all the bargaining power when setting r.
Throughout the paper, only the ratio 2 = 1 a¤ects the level of search diversion. For this reason, we normalize our model by setting
Note that a platform with no revenue from …rst-party content ( 1 = 0) corresponds to = +1, which can be accommodated by the analysis.
For now, we assume the platform does not charge any access fees to consumers. We study the e¤ect of allowing access fees in section 4.
Search diversion
The platform has a design technology that allows it to choose a probability s 2 [0; 1] with which it …rst exposes any given consumer to product 2 before showing her product 1. The probability s represents the level of search diversion induced by the platform. Once a consumer has been exposed to product 2, she knows that she will next be exposed for sure to product 1, but she will then need to incur her search cost c again. The focus of our paper is on platforms'choice of s. We assume that s can be costlessly set to any value between 0 and 1.
One can think of (1 s) as a measure of how e¢ cient the design of the platform is for consumers. Does the platform provide quick and clear access to the products or content that consumers are searching for (low s)? Or does it try to expose consumers to various forms of unsolicited content before providing the service they came for in the …rst place (high s)?
Timing
The timing of the game we consider in this section is as follows:
1. The platform commits to s publicly and credibly 2. The platform sets the fee r to be paid by the advertiser Second, the design parameter s is observed by consumers before deciding whether or not to visit the platform (for instance, through reviews or word of mouth) and by the advertiser before deciding to a¢ liate or not, and we assume it is not subject to ex-post opportunism, i.e. cannot be adjusted once a¢ liation decisions have been made. In fact, it is in the platform's best interest to credibly announce s upfront because s a¤ects not only consumer utility, but also expected payo¤s for the advertiser that the platform is courting. 2 Third, a¢ liation decisions by consumers typically involve longer time horizons than activity (search) decisions. Moreover, a¢ liation is usually based on less information than activity, as consumers learn about the platform gradually. This is captured by our assumption that a¢ liation is based on the level of search diversion and expectation of search costs, while activity (search) is based on the realized individual search cost. This assumption simpli…es the analysis without loss of substance: the key feature that we need is that total consumer demand is decreasing in s (as is realistic).
The consumer search process and a¢ liation decision
In stage 5, consumers a¢ liated with the platform must decide whether to search or not. When the platform has chosen s > 0 and product 2 is a¢ liated, consumers know that they may be diverted. A consumer with search cost c u who is …rst diverted to product 2 will still proceed to product 1, because she knows with certainty that she will obtain net utility u c 0. If the consumer is not diverted, i.e. if she is directly exposed to product 1, then she stops searching immediately and will not be exposed to product 2 (which would yield negative net utility c).
To …x ideas, it is useful to think of an advertising-supported news website. If a user is …rst shown an ad, she will still click or scroll to …nd the news content. If she is shown the content right away, she will never go on searching for ads.
The consumer's net expected utility from searching is thus u (1 + s) c and is positive for c u= (1 + s). Consumers with search cost above u= (1 + s) do not engage in search at all.
Using the news website example, the expected utility provided by the site to such consumers is not su¢ cient to justify the time wasted clicking through or scrolling over ads.
Working backwards to stage 4, a consumer located at x a¢ liates with the platform if and
is the expected consumer utility from the perspective of stage 4, gross of access price and transportation costs. Note that V (s) is decreasing.
If only one product is a¢ liated with the platform then consumers who visit the platform …nd the a¢ liated product with probability 1 in just one round of search. If only product 1 is a¢ liated then expected consumer utility from the perspective of stage 4 is V (0). If only product 2 is a¢ liated then expected consumer utility is 0.
Optimal search diversion
Since the advertiser's per impression pro…t is common knowledge, the platform sets r = (slightly below) in stage 2, which ensures the advertiser a¢ liates and extracts its entire pro…t. 3 The incentives to divert search are thus the same as if the platform were also vertically integrated with the product 2 seller, i.e. if it owned both products.
Total consumer demand for (or tra¢ c to) the platform is then min (V (s) =t; 1), weakly decreasing in the level of search diversion s. The platform's pro…ts as a function of s are
where we have denoted 4 X (s; ) (1 + s ) F u 1 + s the revenues derived by the platform from the product exposures of each a¢ liated consumer.
The optimization of (2) over s involves a trade-o¤ between total consumer tra¢ c and participation in the search process on the one hand, and the average number of product exposures per consumer on the other hand. Indeed, an increase in s induces a consumer to see two products with probability s, which yields revenues 1 + s to the platform, but it also reduces the proportion of consumers who engage in search, F (u= (1 + s)), as well as total consumer tra¢ c to the platform, V (s) =t. Variations of this trade-o¤ are analyzed at length in Hagiu and Jullien (2011). The key novelty here is the term V (s) =t: indeed, Hagiu and Jullien (2011) treat total consumer a¢ liation with the platform as exogenously given, equal to 1.
We also denote:
is decreasing. With this notation, we obtain:
The optimal level of search diversion for a monopoly platform is:
It is (weakly) increasing in and (weakly) decreasing in t.
The second part of the proposition (proven in the appendix) states that the platform diverts search more when it derives higher revenues from the product that consumers are not interested in (advertising) relative to the product that they are interested in (content). The reason is straightforward: when the platform derives more revenues from content (advertising), its interests are more (less) aligned with those of consumers, therefore the optimal level of search diversion is lower (higher Thus, although highly stylized, our model contains the two ingredients necessary to capture the key trade-o¤s associated with search diversion. First, platforms'pro…t incentives are imperfectly aligned with consumer preferences: platforms derive positive revenues from exposing consumers to products that they do not care about ( > 0 and possibly > 1). Second, exposure to individual products is costly for consumers and the platform can make design decisions (captured by s) that in ‡uence the degree to which consumers are exposed to one product relative to the other.
Of course, in most real-world settings there are more than two products, multiple sellers or advertisers per product and perhaps even complementarity or substitutability across products. Introducing any of these aspects would unnecessarily complicate our analysis, since the fundamental mechanics of search diversion remain unchanged. For the same reason, we treat as exogenously given in our model, i.e. we do not endogenize price-setting by independent sellers. Some of these extensions are treated by Hagiu and Jullien (2011) in the context of a monopoly platform choosing search diversion. Finally, while the assumption u 2 = 0 best …ts contexts in which product 2 is advertising (as in the examples listed in Table 1 above), the general implications we derive hold for any platforms that have incentives to divert consumers away from the products that best suit their preferences and towards products they are lessbut still positively -interested in (u 2 > 0). For instance, Net ‡ix uses its recommender system in an attempt to steer users towards less popular movies, which entail lower licensing costs and are less likely to run out of stock, which in turn means they generate higher margins for Net ‡ix (Shih et al. 2007) . A similar practice is used by Amazon.com. Indeed, the di¤erence between diverting consumers to advertising and diverting them to products that they …nd less desirable is simply one of degree. Consumers may derive 0 expected utility from being exposed to advertisements, whereas they might perceive a (small) positive expected utility from being exposed to products other than the ones that they initially came to the platform for. The only thing that matters is that the platform derives positive margins from such unsolicited products.
In a previous draft version, we worked with u 2 > 0: the analysis turned out to be more complex than the one presented here but the main results were the same. This is why we have opted to work with u 2 = 0.
Competition
In this section we analyse how competition a¤ects search diversion incentives. We maintain the same structure of consumer preferences, except that there are now two competing platforms, A and B, one at each end of the Hotelling [0; 1] segment. Each platform is vertically integrated into product 1. Although we use the same label, product 1 on platform A may di¤er from the product 1 on platform B. We consider three competition scenarios:
i) Competition for consumers: the advertiser can multihome and the platforms compete solely for the exclusive a¢ liation of consumers ii) Competition for advertising: consumers can multihome (at no charge) and the platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of a unique advertiser iii) Two-sided competition: the platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of both consumers and the independent advertiser.
Case (i) is most relevant for traditional advertising-supported media platforms such as television or newspapers, where consumers typically watch one channel or subscribe to one newspaper, whereas large advertisers typically place ads in multiple outlets. This is the "classic" case of competition among media platforms studied by Anderson and Coate (2005) and also used by Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010). Case (i) also remains relevant for some Internet platforms (e.g. e-commerce, search engines), where consumers tend to singlehome due to switching costs (habit formation, limited attention). By contrast, consumers may perceive low switching costs for other Internet platforms (e.g. online news), so that they routinely visit multiple sites. In such contexts, advertisers may prefer to singlehome due to budget constraints and to the fact they may be able to reach the same consumers on either platform. Case (iii) may seem like a more rare occurrence in reality, but it provides an interesting comparison point to cases (i) and
(ii). Furthermore, the underlying mechanisms are quite di¤erent.
Note that we omit the fourth logical scenario, in which both sides multihome: in that case there would be no competition for participation on either side, which is our focus. 5 In all three competition scenarios, the timing is the same as in the monopoly case. Platforms A and B commit simultaneously to s A and s B respectively in stage 1 (publicly and credibly), then simultaneously set fees r A and r B to be paid by the advertiser in stage 2. The other stages are similar, with agents (advertiser and consumers) choosing to a¢ liate exclusively or not, depending on the competition scenario. When a consumer is a¢ liated with both platforms, her stage 5 utility from engaging in product search on one platform is independent of what she does on the other platform.
We have separated the choices of s i and r i between the …rst two stages of the game in order to better re ‡ect reality: fees charged to sellers are typically set after committing to platform design. Our equilibrium characterization below would be the same if we worked with the entire space of (s i ; r i ) deviations. The di¤erence is that the set of equilibrium conditions to satisfy would be signi…cantly more complicated; this is another reason for adopting our simpler set-up.
Competition for consumers
In this scenario, the advertiser multihomes whereas consumers singlehome. In stage 2, each platform sets r i = and the advertiser a¢ liates with both platforms. 6 If t is not too large so that the two platforms actually compete against each other, then platform i's pro…ts from the perspective of stage 1 are:
In this case, the equilibrium level of search diversion solves:
5 Despite the absence of competition when both sides multihome, the multiplicity of o¤ers reduces the pro…t of each platform because there may be competition in terms of service usage (as opposed to participation). See Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Athey, Calvano and Gans (2012), Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger (2012) or Taylor (2012) . 6 This scenario is equivalent to assuming that each platform is vertically integrated into products 1 and 2.
In contrast, if t is large, then each platform acts as a local monopolist and chooses the monopoly level of search diversion. Relegating the remaining details to the appendix, we obtain:
Lemma 1 There exists t 1 > V (s XV ( )) such that the symmetric equilibrium level of search diversion when platforms compete for consumers only is:
It is increasing in t for t 2 0; t 1 , decreasing in t for t 2 t 1 ; 2V (s XV ( )) , and everywhere (weakly) increasing in .
On the interval t 2 0; t 1 , i.e. when platforms compete, t has the opposite e¤ect on s c relative to s M . To explain this, recall that the level of search diversion results from a trade-o¤ between revenue per user (1 + sr) and total participation by consumers. The latter becomes less elastic when competition for consumers is less intense (larger t), which shifts the trade-o¤ towards extracting more revenues per user, i.e. towards more diversion. On the other hand, if t is above the t 1 threshold, then platforms no longer compete against each other, therefore s c is decreasing in t, just like s M . The comparative statics in is the same as for the monopoly platform and the same interpretation applies.
We can now compare s c with s M :
Relative to the level of search diversion chosen by a monopoly platform, the equilibrium level of search diversion when platforms compete for consumers only is strictly lower for low t, strictly higher for intermediate t, and equal for large t. Speci…cally:
To illustrate, Figure 1 represents s c and s M as functions of t.
Figure 1
Restricting attention to the region of interest t 2 0; t 1 (on which platforms actually compete), our model predicts that the equilibrium level of search diversion with competing platforms is lower than the one chosen by a monopolist when competition is intense (low t) and higher when competition is not too intense (high t). When t is small, the total consumer participation for the monopolist does not depend on search diversion -it is …xed at 1. Therefore, the monopolist only accounts for the e¤ect of search diversion on revenues per participating consumer, X (s; ). In contrast, when t is small, competing platforms must take into account the e¤ect of their respective levels of search diversion not just on revenues per participating consumer, but also on overall consumer participation. Since total consumer demand for a given platform is decreasing in the level of search diversion, it is natural that competing platforms end up choosing a lower equilibrium level of search diversion. Consider now that case when t is large enough so that the monopolist no longer …nds it optimal to attract all consumers. In this case, the marginal e¤ect of search diversion perceived by the monopolist incorporates both the e¤ect on revenues per participating consumer (X s (s; )) and the e¤ect on total consumer participation (V 0 (s) =t). If t is not too large so that competing platforms are still constrained by competition for consumers, then they also take into account both e¤ects. The only di¤erence is that each competing platform perceives a marginal (negative) e¤ect of search diversion on total consumer demand equal to V 0 (s) =2t, which is half of the e¤ect perceived by the monopolist. This simply re ‡ects the fact that competitive pressure reduces platforms'ability to gain additional consumer participation. As a result, in this case the monopolist ends up choosing a lower level of search diversion than the competing platforms.
One can also interpret this result (competing platforms diverting search more than a monopolist) by relying on the elasticity of consumer participation with respect to search diversion.
This elasticity is sV 0 (s) =V (s) in the case of a monopoly that does not cover the entire consumer market (i.e. t > V (s)), whereas it is equal to sV 0 (s) =t for a duopoly with equal market shares. Thus, if t > V (s) then the former elasticity is larger, which leads to less search diversion under monopoly. On the other hand, the opposite holds if the monopolist covers the entire consumer market (t < V (s XV ( ))): the monopolist's choice of search diversion ignores the impact on consumer a¢ liation decisions, which competing platforms can never ignore.
Competition for unsolicited content
Consider now the opposite scenario relative to the previous subsection: consumers can costlessly multihome and the platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation of an advertiser. Speci…cally, we assume that the platforms o¤er non-substitutable versions of product 1 (content), so that a consumer who a¢ liates with both intermediaries derives utility 2u from consuming the two versions of product 1 (gross of search and transportation costs). We assume the advertiser a¢ liates exclusively with one platform. 7 If the advertiser a¢ liates with platform A, then platform A pro…ts are X (s A ; r A ) min (V (s A ) =t; 1),
whereas platform B pro…ts are F (u) min (V (0) =t; 1). The advertiser's payo¤ is
Relegating the remaining details to the appendix, we obtain: 7 Exclusive a¢ liation by the advertiser could be obtained endogenously by assuming that, for each consumer, only the …rst product exposure matters and that there is a su¢ ciently large probability that the same consumers are exposed to advertising on both platforms (see Athey Calvano and Gans 2012).
Proposition 3 When consumers multihome and platforms compete for the exclusive a¢ liation
of an advertiser, the equilibrium level of search diversion is the same as that chosen by a monopoly platform: s a ( ; t) = s M ( ; t).
Thus, competition for product 2 (advertising) does not a¤ect search diversion relative to a monopolist. This result is driven by Bertrand competition for the advertiser. Each platform i sets its search diversion level s i to maximize its joint pro…ts with the advertiser when the latter a¢ liates with i exclusively, i.e. X (s i ; ) min (V (s i ) =t; 1). Then both platforms compete in fees r i so that the advertiser ends up capturing all of the joint pro…ts in excess of each platform's outside option, F (u) min (V (0) =t; 1), which does not depend on search diversion levels. Consequently, although competition shifts the split of the joint vertical pro…t in favor of the advertiser, it is still optimal for platforms to choose the design that maximizes this joint pro…t. The di¤erence is that a monopoly platform maximizes the value that can be extracted from the advertiser, whereas competing platforms seek to maximize the chance to attract the advertiser.
Competition for both consumers and advertising
Let us now turn to the case in which the two platforms compete for exclusive a¢ liation on both sides of the market. The full analysis of this competition scenario turns out to be signi…cantly more complex than for the previous two cases and is therefore provided in the Online Appendix.
Here, we highlight the main feature of the resulting equilibrium.
The key di¤erence with the two previous competition scenarios is that here it is no longer clear whether both platforms wish to compete for the advertiser. To see why, suppose platform A "wins" the exclusive a¢ liation of the advertiser in Stage 2. Then the "losing" platform B obtains higher consumer demand, which may compensate for its lower revenues per consumer (no advertising). Thus, given the levels of search diversion set in stage 1, it is possible that B obtains a larger pro…t without the advertiser than the maximum pro…t it could expect to achieve if it were to attract the advertiser. When this is the case, platform B prefers not to make an o¤er to the advertiser in stage 2 and platform A is a de facto monopoly on the advertiser side of the market. As a result, the level of search diversion chosen by platform A simply maximizes its joint pro…ts with the advertiser, conditional on platform B not having any advertising at all.
The alternative scenario is when platform B does indeed wish to compete for the advertiser in Stage 2 of the game. Then the equilibrium level of search diversion chosen by platform A maximizes total industry pro…ts, i.e. including the advertiser and both platforms. The reason that platform B's pro…t is taken into account is as follows: A must o¤er the advertiser a payo¤ just above the largest payo¤ that can be o¤ered by B, which is the di¤erence between its joint pro…t with the advertiser and what B gets when the advertiser a¢ liates with A.
Raising the latter (i.e. B's outside option) reduces B's bene…ts from winning the contest for the advertiser and thereby decreases the value A needs to forego in order to attract the advertiser.
In particular, if the advertiser a¢ liates with A, increasing search diversion by platform A raises platform B's pro…t because it leads more consumers go to B instead of A. In other words, when it expects platform B to compete for the advertiser, the winning platform A maximizes total industry pro…t because it internalizes the fact that yielding more consumer demand to platform B (through more search diversion) reduces the cost of attracting the advertiser, by reducing platform B's willingness to compete.
In both scenarios, the comparative statics of the equilibrium level of search diversion in (t; ) are the same as in the case of competition for consumers and interpreted in the same way.
Relegating the full analysis to the Online Appendix, we directly provide the main result:
Relative to the level of search diversion chosen by a monopoly platform s M ( ; t), the maximum level of search diversion that can be sustained in equilibrium when platforms compete for both consumers and the advertiser, s ( ; t), is strictly lower for low t and strictly higher for large t. Speci…cally, there exist t 2 2 [0; V (0)] and t 3 > V (0) such that:
This result con…rms the one obtained under competition for consumers only (despite a signi…cantly more complex analysis): once again, the equilibrium level of search diversion with competing platforms is lower than the one chosen by a monopolist when competition is intense (low t) and higher when competition is not too intense (high t). The explanation is the same.
Access fees
In this section we introduce the possibility that platforms can charge access fees to consumers, denoted by P and paid before search costs c are observed. A priori, P can be positive or negative.
A negative access fee can be interpreted as a monetary subsidy (e.g. cash or redeemable points) or …rst-party content (beyond product 1) that consumers value at more than the price being charged.
The timing we use throughout this section (monopoly as well as competing platforms) is: Our timing ensures that decisions regarding consumer access fees do not interfere with decisions a¤ecting the quality of the services o¤ered to consumers (search diversion). The value expected by consumers from each platform results from the combination of search diversion and the advertiser's a¢ liation decisions, and it is known at the time price competition for consumers occurs. 8 As in the previous sections, we have separated the choices of s i and r i between the …rst two stages of the game.
Platforms choose s

Monopoly
The monopoly platform's pro…ts are now:
It is straightforward to obtain (details are in the appendix): York Times charges users a subscription fee, whereas access to Forbes is entirely free for users.
Advertising on the New York Times web page is moderate; in contrast, advertising is highly intrusive on Forbes.com. A similar comparison applies to YouTube and Hulu. YouTube derives no revenues from …rst-party content or subscription fees and its advertisements are quite intrusive (sometimes 15 seconds with no opt-out before being able to watch a 2-minute video).
Hulu relies on membership fees (Hulu Plus) and video-on-demand revenues -as a result, its advertisements are quite limited.
Competition
Consider the …rst competition scenario, in which the advertiser multihomes and consumers singlehome. In stage 2 the platforms set r A = r B = , thus fully extracting the advertiser's surplus. As a result, stage 4 pro…ts for platform i are:
Given (s i ; s j ) chosen in stage 1, the stage 2 pricing equilibrium is easily veri…ed to be P i = t + (V (s i ) V (s j ) X (s j ; ) 2X (s i ; )) =3, leading to stage 1 platform pro…ts:
Going backwards to stage 1, the symmetric equilibrium level of search diversion is: 
In other words, we obtain the same level of search diversion as the one chosen by a monopoly platform. The following proposition (proven in the appendix) con…rms that this is also true under the other two competition scenarios (their analysis is more complicated): Thus, when access fees are feasible, the equilibrium level of search diversion is identical to the one chosen by a monopoly platform. In this case, platforms maximize the joint surplus of the relationship with consumers and use the access fee to share this surplus with consumers.
Competition only a¤ects the level of the access fee.
In all three competition cases, the central part of the proof is showing that in the equilibrium of the game starting at stage 2 the advertiser a¢ liates with the platform i that creates the highest joint surplus X (s i ; ) + V (s i ). This was straightforward for the scenario with competition for consumers only, but turns out to be more complicated for the other two scenarios (cf. appendix).
The fundamental reason we obtain the equilibrium level of search diversion that maximizes X (s; ) + V (s) for all monopoly and competition cases is that the access fee allows platforms to transfer surplus so all that matters beyond stage 1 of the game is the total surplus per consumer. The result for the scenario when the advertiser multihomes echoes similar results in Choi (2006) and Crampes, Haritchabalet and Jullien (2009) . In all of these models, platforms maximize the joint platform-consumer surplus; this corresponds to total surplus per consumer in our model, because each platform extracts the entire pro…t from the vertical structure (platform plus advertiser).
The two scenarios with advertiser singlehoming are more complex because competition for the advertiser reduces the surplus that platforms can share with consumers (due to low advertising fees). Since consumer prices are set after the fees charged to the advertiser, opportunistic platform behaviour leads to consumer prices that are too high from the perspective of the vertical structure (platform and advertiser). For these two scenarios, we show that, despite this double marginalization, the total pro…t that can be promised by each platform to the advertiser remains increasing in the total surplus per consumer. Thus, in equilibrium, competition for the advertiser still leads the platform winning the advertiser to maximize the total surplus per consumer. Indeed, the platform generating the highest total surplus is able to o¤er better terms to the advertiser along with higher fees. Higher advertising fees act as a commitment device inducing the platform to reduce the price charged to consumers, which is bene…cial for the vertical structure. This logic applies both when consumers multihome and when they singlehome.
For the second part of the proposition, the result and interpretation is the same as in the monopoly case above. If platforms charge positive access fees to consumers, they must o¤er them more value, i.e. less diversion. Conversely, if platforms subsidize the participation of consumers, they need to make up for the loss by increasing advertising revenues, which they can achieve by increasing diversion.
Conclusion
Our study of search diversion by competing platforms has yielded several important and novel Second, allowing platforms to charge unrestricted access fees to consumers leads to the striking result that competing platforms choose the exact same level of search diversion as a monopoly platform, irrespective of the nature of competition and of the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation. Furthermore, under monopoly and competition with at least one multihoming side, platforms that charge positive access fees to consumers have weaker incentives to divert search relative to platforms that cannot (or choose not to) charge such fees. On the other hand, platforms that subsidize consumer participation have stronger incentives to divert search.
Proof of Proposition 1
If t 2 [V (s X ) ; V (s XV )] then s M ( ; t) = V 1 (t), decreasing in t and constant in .
If t V (s X ) then s M ( ; t) = arg max s fX (s; )g, so the F.O.C. determining s M can be written:
The left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming second-order conditions are satis…ed) that s M ( ; t) is increasing in . It is obviously constant in t.
If t V (s XV ) then s M ( ; t) = arg max s fX (s; ) V (s)g, so the F.O.C. determining s M is:
Since V 0 (s) < 0, the left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming second-order conditions are satis…ed) that s M ( ; t) is increasing in and constant in t.
Proof of Lemma 1
Given s j , platform i's pro…ts are:
There are therefore 3 possible equilibria:
1) s c = s XV 2 , where s XV 2 solves equation (6), so that s XV 2 is determined by the following F.O.C.:
From this, it is easily seen that s XV 2 is increasing in t. It is also increasing in by a very similar argument to that employed in the proof of proposition 1. This is an equilibrium if and only if V (s XV 2 ) t=2 (the consumer in the middle of the Hotelling segment obtains non-negative utility),
i.e. only if t t 1 , where t 1 is uniquely de…ned by:
so that V (s XV 2 ( ; V (s XV ))) > V (s XV ) =2, which implies t 1 > V (s XV ).
2) s c = s XV . This is an equilibrium if and only if V (s XV ) t=2, i.e. if and only if t 2V (s XV ).
Let us show that 2V (s XV ) > t 1 . The …rst-order conditions that determine s XV 2 ; t 1 and s XV ( ) are, respectively:
Comparing the two, it is clear that s XV 2 ; t 1 > s XV ( ), which implies:
Thus, for s 1 = V 1 (t=2) to be a best response to s 2 = V 1 (t=2), it must be that s XV V 1 (t=2), i.e. if t 2V (s XV ).
If s 1 V 1 (t=2) then platform 1's pro…ts are:
The maximizer s of this pro…t expression is de…ned by the …rst-order condition:
Thus, for s 1 = V 1 (t=2) to be a best response to s 2 = V 1 (t=2), it must be that s V 1 (t=2),
i.e. V (s ) t=2, which implies:
Comparing this with the …rst-order condition determining s XV 2 ; t 1 , X (s; ) V 0 (s) + 2V (s) X s (s; ) = 0,
we must have t t 1 .
Thus, s c = V 1 (t=2) is an equilibrium if and only if t 2 t 1 ; 2V (s XV ) . Note that V 1 (t=2) is decreasing in t.
Proof of Proposition 2
On the interval t 2 0; t 1 , we know from proposition 1 and lemma 1 that s M is decreasing in t,
whereas s c = s XV 2 is increasing in t. Furthermore, from (12), we have s XV 2 = s XV = s M at t = V (s XV ). We can conclude that s c < s M for t < V (s XV ) and s c > s M for V (s XV ) < t < t 1 .
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider stage 3. The advertiser's payo¤ from a¢ liating exclusively with platform i is:
while platform i's payo¤ is X (s i ; r i ) min (V (s i ) =t; 1). In stage 2, platform i is prepared to lower its fee r i until its payo¤ is equal to its outside option, F (u) min (V (0) =t; 1). Consequently, in the equilibrium of the game starting at stage 2, the advertiser a¢ liates with the platform that has the highest X (s i ; r i ) min (V (s i ) =t; 1). The fees in the stage 2 equilibrium are determined by:
for the "winning" platform i and:
for the "losing" platform j.
Consider now stage 1. If X (s i ; ) min (V (s i ) =t; 1) > X (s j ; ) min (V (s j ) =t; 1) then platform i attracts the advertiser with probability 1 and obtains pro…ts There are only two possibilities: 
The left-hand side is increasing in , which implies (assuming the second-order condition is satis…ed) that s X+V is increasing in .
The optimal access fee is:
Now compare s X+V and s XV by looking at the …rst-order conditions that determine them: The determination of the equilibrium level of search diversion b s c ( ) is in the main text. For the second part of the proposition, the equilibrium access fee charged by the two platforms is P C c = t X (b s c ( ) ; ). The two …rst order conditions that determine b s c ( ) and s c ( ) = s XV 2 (focusing on the case in which platforms actually compete) are, respectively:
Comparing, it is easily seen that b s c s c if and only if t X (b s c ( ) ; ), i.e. if and only if P C c 0.
Consumers multihome and the advertiser singlehomes
Suppose that in stage 3 the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i 2 fA; Bg. Then, in stage 4, platform i's pro…ts are (P i + X (s i ; r i )) min f(V (s i ) P i ) =t; 1g, which it optimizes over P i to obtain pro…ts equal to P (V i (s i ) + X (s i ; r i )), where:
Clearly, P (:) is increasing. In turn, platform j's stage 4 pro…ts are P (V (0) + F (u)) 0 .
The advertiser's payo¤ from a¢ liation with platform i is then:
In Stage 2, platforms choose (r A ; r B ) taking (s A ; s B ) as given, which is equivalent to choosing
Indeed, recall that X (s i ; r i ) is increasing in r i so there is a one-to-one relationship between r i and Z i for each i 2 fA; Bg.
To simplify notation, we also denote:
which are …xed from the perspective of stage 2.
It is easily seen that adv (Z i ; W i ) is single-peaked in Z i and increasing in W i . Let also:
We …rst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In the stage 2 equilibrium, if the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i then W i W j .
Proof. If the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i in stage 3, then in the stage 2 equilibrium (choices of Z i and Z j ) we must have:
Denote by Z i ; Z j the resulting equilibrium choices.
Since P (Z i ) is increasing in Z i , whereas adv (Z i ; W i ) is single-peaked in Z i and zero for Z i = W i , in equilibrium the constraint in the program (14) must be binding with the highest possible value
There are two possibilities. First, if the constraint in program (15) is not binding in equilibrium then:
Combined with (14) , this implies:
It is easily veri…ed that this implies W i W j .
Second, suppose instead the constraint in (15) is binding in equilibrium:
where the last inequality is required in equilibrium (otherwise platform i would prefer to not attract the advertiser). Since P (:) is increasing, this is equivalent to:
Furthermore, if the constraint in (15) 
Once again, there are two possibilities:
From (13), this is only possible if W i > W j (and W j < 4t): (16) and (14) imply
Suppose that in equilibrium platform A wins the advertiser. Then W A W B and platform A's pro…ts can we rewritten:
where: For the second part of the proposition corresponding to this scenario, simply note that b s a = b s M (which we have just proven) and s a = s M (from proposition 3). And we have already proven that b s M s M if and only if P M 0 (proposition 5). We can therefore directly conclude that b s a s a if and only if P a 0 (since P a = P M ).
Both sides singlehome
Suppose that in stage 3 the advertiser a¢ liates with platform i 2 fA; Bg. Then, in stage 4, platform i and platform j's pro…ts are, respectively:
Calculating the Nash equilibrium in prices, we obtain that stage 4 equilibrium pro…ts are, respectively:
The advertiser's payo¤ from a¢ liation with platform i is then: i adv = (X (s i ; ) X (s i ; r i )) 1 2t t + V (s i ) + X (s i ; r i ) V (0) F (u) 3
In Stage 2, platforms choose (r A ; r B ) taking (s A ; s B ) as given, which is equivalent to choosing (Z A ; Z B ), where:
Denote also:
W i X (s i ; ) + V (s i ) for i 2 f1; 2g
Suppose that platform i wins the advertiser. Then platform pro…ts in stage 4 can be written: which does not depend on Z A . Pick then any " such that 0 < " < W 0 A W A . We have Z 0 A Z A + " > Z A . To see this, note that 1 2t t + Z A W 0 3 2 is increasing in Z A and:
where the last equality follows from the fact that 1
Second, suppose the constraint in the de…nition of b A (W B ; Z A ) is binding, which implies
There are now two possibilities regarding Z 0 A :
If the constraint in the de…nition of b adv (W B ; Z 0 A ) is also binding then we have:
Comparing (27) and (28), the only di¤erence is W 0
If the constraint in the de…nition of b adv (W B ; Z 0 A ) is not binding then:
and, since the constraint in the de…nition of b adv (W B ; Z A ) is binding, we also have:
Thus, in all possible cases, we have Z 0 A > Z A , which means that s 0 Thus, in all cases it is an equilibrium for platform B to also choose s B = s X+V (this is the only equilibrium if the constraint in program 20 is not binding).
